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Cooper v. State, 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 104 (Dec. 27, 2018)1 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE 
 
Summary 
 
 The Court determined that removing a potential juror on the basis of race is a violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause and held that the district court erred when it did not find a prima facie 
showing of race-based discrimination during the jury selection process.  
 
Background 
 
 James Cooper, an African-American man, was initially charged with two separate counts 
of child abuse, neglect or endangerment and one count each of battery constituting domestic 
violence committed by strangulation and battery constituting domestic violence. These charges 
were made in connection with his behavior at the home of the victim and her two children.  
 During the jury selection process, the State used two peremptory challenges to remove two 
jurors: Juror No. 217 and Juror No. 274. These two jurors were African-American and therefore, 
the same race as Cooper. The challenges came after all for-cause challenges were resolved. The 
venire at the time of the challenges contained twenty-three prospective jurors, including three 
African-Americans.  
Cooper objected to the peremptory challenges pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky.2 Cooper 
argued that the prospective jurors indicated they could be fair and, therefore, the current 
circumstances of the challenges portrayed a pattern of striking African-American jurors. The State 
rebutted by stating the African-American jurors were excused for-cause and that there was no 
prima facie showing of discrimination. Moreover, the State argued that they only needed to justify 
their reasoning if there was a prima facie showing of discrimination. The district court did not 
make such a finding. It found that Cooper’s objection was based on a dislike for the racial make-
up of the venire. The court also found that it could think of many non-discriminatory reasons the 
State would have wanted to strike the two prospective jurors. Accordingly, the district court 
dismissed the Batson challenge without allowing Cooper to provide further analysis. This appeal 
followed.  
 
Discussion 
 
 When a party raises a race-based objection to a peremptory challenge, the Court must conduct 
the three-part Batson analysis.3 First, the party opposing the peremptory strike must make a “prima 
facie showing that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race.”4 Once such a 
showing is made, the party advocating for the peremptory strike must provide any race-neutral 
explanations for the strike.5 Lastly, the district court is required to hear the arguments and 
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determine whether the party opposing the peremptory strike has proven purposeful 
discrimination.6 
 In the present case, the Court found that the prima facie showing in the first step of the Batson 
analysis does not require the peremptory strike opponent to meet their ultimate burden of proof.7 
Rather, the party must provide “sufficient evidence to permit the trier of fact to draw an inference 
that discrimination occurred.”8 One example of an inference of discrimination could be a ‘pattern’ 
of strikes against black jurors included in the venire.9 Other evidence that may be sufficient 
includes “the disproportionate effect of peremptory strikes [and] the nature of the proponent’s 
questions and statements during voir dire.”10  
 Here, the State used 40 percent of its peremptory challenges (2 of 5) to remove 67 percent of 
African Americans in the venire (2 of 3). The Court acknowledged that numbers alone are not 
enough to prove prima facie discrimination, however, the numbers here proved a disproportionate 
effect on African Americans, creating an inference of discrimination. The Court decided that this 
inference of purposeful discrimination was enough to constitute a prima facie showing of 
discrimination under the totality of the circumstances.  
 Because the district court dismissed the Batson analysis at its’ first-step, the Court here had 
an inadequate record to perform the second-step of the Batson analysis. The Court found this 
inappropriate because the Batson framework calls for real answers, not judicial speculation.11 The 
inadequacy was especially problematic because the State asked venire members what their opinion 
about the Black Lives Matter movement was, which was minimally relevant at best. While that 
question contained race-based implications constituting further purposeful discrimination, the 
Court could not perform the second step of the Batson analysis without hearing the State’s 
reasoning.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Court found that the district court erred when it stopped the Batson analysis at the first 
step, where it found that a prima facie showing of discrimination did not exist and that the record 
does not clearly support the denial of Cooper’s objection. Accordingly, the Court reversed 
Cooper’s conviction and remanded to the district court for a new trial.   
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